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Abstract
We propose an endogenous growth model incorporating social capital. Social cap-
ital only serves as an input in the production of human capital and it involves a cost
in terms of the final good. In contrast to alternative specifications, this model en-
sures that social capital enhances productivity gains by playing the role of a timing
belt that drives the transmission and propagation of all productivity shocks. We find
that, depending on the measure of social capital, the elasticity of human capital to
social capital varies from 6% to 10%. Finally, we investigate the short-term dynamics
and imbalance effect properties of the model, depending on the value of this elastic-
ity. In particular, we show that when the substitutability of social capital for human
capital increases, the economy is better equipped to surmount initial imbalances as
individuals may allocate more working time to the final good sector without impeding
economic growth.
Keywords: social capital, human capital, economic growth, imbalance effects.
JEL Classification: C61, E20, E22, E24, O41.
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1 Introduction
The concept of social capital has recently received rising acceptance in economics research.
It has been pointed to as a potential source of economic growth and economic performance
(Putnam et al., 1993; Knack and Keefer, 1997; Beugelsdijk and van Schaik, 2005). As with
other sociological concepts, social capital encompasses several different meanings. Accord-
ing to Knack and Keefer (1997), trust, cooperative norms, and associations within groups
represent the essence of the definition of social capital. Putnam et al. (1993, p.167) support
this view by defining social capital as “those features of social organization, such as trust,
norms, and networks, that can improve the efficiency of society by facilitating co-ordinated
actions”.
It may, however, be difficult to pick out a definition suitable for a tractable economic
model. One approach to modeling social capital is to focus on the “capital” aspect of social
capital (Routledge and Amsberg, 2003).1 Within this approach, several modeling strategies
may be used. One of these strategies is to consider social capital as a factor of production
(Chou, 2006). The intuition driving this modeling strategy is that spending time developing
a personal network may increase the income of specific professions like medical practitioners
and solicitors.2 In that context, the effect of social capital is to enhance the output of final
good.
An alternative modeling strategy may be considered where social capital affects the
accumulation of other factors of production rather than social capital being a new factor
of production in its own right. For example, if social capital leads to the establishment of
informal credit markets, this will ease the accumulation of physical, and perhaps human,
capital (Knowles, 2005).
In this contribution we choose specifically to account for the influence of social capital
in human capital accumulation. To do so, we assume that human capital and social capital
are both necessary inputs for human capital accumulation and that social capital does not
play a role in the production of goods and services. The literature on social capital has ac-
knowledged that trusting societies, in addition to having stronger incentives to innovate and
to accumulate physical capital, are also likely to have higher returns to the accumulation of
human capital. Where trust improves access to credit for the poor, enrollment in secondary
education — which, unlike primary education, has a high cost in foregone income — may
be higher (Galor and Zeira, 1993; Knack and Keefer, 1997). The issue of the interaction
between human and social capital and their joint effects on economic growth, although less
developed by the literature, is very important. Glaeser et al. (2002) find a strong empirical
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relationship between human capital and membership of a given social organization (the
proxy used to measure social capital). Regarding the cost of social capital accumulation,
we assume that it is incurred in terms of final good production. This assumption allows us
to capture that maintaining social networks may be costly in terms of resources that could
otherwise be allocated to consumption or physical capital accumulation.3
Needless to say, social capital may affect economic development through many more
channels than human capital accumulation as the definition given above may suggest. This
said, the interaction with human capital accumulation is key if one is concerned with eco-
nomic growth and development. Although we do not model explicitly how social interac-
tions, networking and norms shape the relationship between human and social capital, we
highlight the implications for economic development paths of introducing social capital in
the framework of reduced forms multi-sector growth models popularized by Lucas (1988).
As we will show, such an extension enriches the analysis considerably.
Previewing our main results, we theoretically show that the impact of social capital
on long-term growth as measured by the elasticity of human capital with respect to social
capital in the education sector is ambiguous. One effect is obvious: since social capital
adds to human capital as a growth engine, long-term growth should be increased through
this additional channel. Furthermore, one would conclude that, following this reasoning,
the more important is the role of social capital in the education sector, the larger the long-
term growth attainable. However, this property is not true for all values of the elasticity
of human capital to social capital: in particular, when this elasticity is close to zero, the
long-term growth rate first decreases. It only rises when this elasticity becomes large
enough. Therefore, there is another mechanism counter-balancing the one just mentioned,
the interaction of both being responsible for that non-monotonic pattern. This opposite
mechanism may be explained as follows: as the elasticity rises, the education sector relies
less on human capital and more on social capital, which leads to a smaller share of human
capital in the education sector (and more in the final good sector), ultimately pushing
long-term growth down.
Finally, we provide a complete study of the dynamic implications of social capital. To
this end, we carefully calibrate the model and simulate the resulting dynamic systems.
Two sets of exercises are considered: technological shocks and imbalance effects analysis.
For the exercises to be insightful, we consider three different structures depending on the
value of elasticity of human capital with respect to social capital: the limit Lucas-Uzawa
case, the “realistic” parametrization using the result of the prior econometric step, and
a last fictive case where social capital is as important as human capital in the education
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sector. It is shown that this elasticity parameter plays a crucial role in the short-term
dynamics and imbalance effects generated by the model. In particular, it is shown that
when the substitutability of social capital for human capital increases, the economy is
better equipped to surmount initial imbalances as individuals may allocate more working
time to the final good sector without impeding economic growth.
The paper is organized as follows. The second section describes the model. The third
section presents some numerical simulations. Finally, section 4 provides some concluding
remarks.
2 The model
We present here our endogenous growth model with many identical infinitely lived agents
and two sectors. The final good sector production technology relies on a Cobb-Douglas
production function using two types of input: physical and human capital. The second
model is devoted to human capital accumulation thanks to a Cobb-Douglas human capital
technology, using human and social capital as inputs. As just mentioned, the output of
the final good sector can be used for consumption, investment in physical capital or for
investment in social capital. Therefore, in our model, each agent faces a trade-off between
devoting human capital to final good production and to human capital accumulation, and
allocating final good production to consumption, investments in physical capital or to social
capital.
In light of the above, our formal model implies the following assumptions: (1) the
building or accumulation of social capital requires resources to be diverted from final good
production; (2) social capital decays over time without new “investment” in social capital;
(3) social capital has a positive impact in human capital accumulation but no direct effect
on final good production; (4) human capital has positive intertemporal spillovers in its
accumulation; and (5) human capital is an important input in final good production.
2.1 Production of final good and capital accumulation
2.1.1 First sector: final good production, physical and social capital accumu-
lation
The final good sector produces a homogeneous good that is used either for consumption
or for investment in either physical or social capital. The investment in social capital may
increase social interaction. It is detrimental to the physical capital accumulation since it
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reduces the amount of resources devoted to the physical capital investment. Therefore,
it is potentially harmful to the growth of final good production. Moreover, it implies
an opportunity cost in terms of foregone consumption. However, as shown in the next
subsection, those adverse effects may be compensated by its positive impact on human
capital growth. Individuals allocate a fraction u(t) of their time to the production of final
good. Under the Cobb-Douglas technology, the production function takes the following
form:
Y (t) = A (K (t))α (u (t)H (t))1−α = C (t) + IK (t) + IS (t) (1)
The remaining fraction of time is allocated to human capital accumulation. Equation
(1) shows that production of the final good enables current consumption, and investment
in either physical or social capital. Physical and social capital laws of accumulation are
respectively:
K (t+ 1) = IK (t) + (1− δ)K (t) = Y (t)− C (t)− IS (t) + (1− δ)K (t) (2)
S (t+ 1) = IS (t) + (1− δ)S (t) (3)
We consider that all forms of capital depreciate at the same rate δ.
2.1.2 Second sector: human capital accumulation
Individuals allocate the complementary fraction of their time, i.e. 1−u (t), to the accumu-
lation of human capital
H (t+ 1) = B ((1− u (t))H (t))β (S (t))1−β + (1− δ)H (t) (4)
The law of motion depicted in (4) is consistent with the assumption that the final good
sector is more intensive in physical capital while the education sector is more intensive in
human and social capital. Social capital and human capital are to a certain extent comple-
mentary in the educational sector production function. This captures the aforementioned
observation that social capital is important in the creation of human capital and that both
interact in human capital accumulation. Further, one may ensure the usual requirement
that the final good sector is less intensive in human capital than the education sector (social
capital aside). This requires the following restriction:
1− α < β,
to hold. We keep this in mind throughout this paper, but we also consider theoretically
possible situations where the education sector output relies more on social capital than on
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“pure” human capital. This possibility is certainly consistent with a much less academic
view of human capital. In this case, the elasticity parameter β might be below 1− α.
Eventually, this model exhibits an asymmetry that is quite standard in a two-sector
endogenous growth model (Mulligan and Sala-i-Martin, 1992): we have on the one hand
physical capital and social capital whose accumulations are a perfect substitute for con-
sumption, and on the other hand human capital, whose accumulation proceeds from a
different technology.
2.2 Firms
The final good sector produces a composite good that is used either to consume or to
invest in physical capital or in social capital. Following the classical Ramsey, Cass and
Koopmans model (Barro and Sala-i-Martin, 1995), we make the standard assumption that
firms produce final good, pay wages for human capital input and make rental payments for
physical capital input. Given the Cobb-Douglas production function already described in
Equation (1), the discounted profits are given by:
Π (t) =
∞∑
t=0
[Y (t)− r (t)K (t)− wY (t) (u (t)H (t))]R (t) (5)
where R (0) = 1 and R (t) =
t∏
τ=0
(
1
1 + r (τ)
)
is the discount factor at time t.
The representative firm chooses physical capital and human capital in order to maximize
its discounted profits taking prices as given and subject to its technological constraint:
max
{K(t)∞t=0,(u(t)H(t))
∞
t=0}
Π(t) (6)
Because the firm rents capital and labor services and does not face any adjustment costs,
there are no intertemporal elements in the firm’s optimization problem. This implies that
the problem of maximizing the present value of profits reduces to a problem of maximizing
profits in each period without considering the outcomes in other periods as in the Ramsey,
Cass and Koopmans model (Barro and Sala-i-Martin, 1995). Therefore, the first–order
conditions that characterize an interior maximum for Π (t) are the following:
r (t) = αA (K (t) /u (t)H (t))α−1 (7)
wY (t) = (1− α)A (K (t) / (u (t)H (t)))
α (8)
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Equations (7) and (8) indicate that the firm chooses the ratio of physical to human
capital in order to equate the rental price of physical capital (i.e. the interest rate) to
the marginal product of capital and the wage rate to the marginal product of labor. This
implies for the firm zero profit in each period since factor payments exhaust total output.
2.3 Households behavior
We consider a closed economy inhabited by a constant population normalized to one. This
population is composed of identical infinitely lived households that maximize the following
intertemporal utility function:
∞∑
t=0
C (t)1−σ − 1
1− σ
ρt, ρ > 0, σ > 0 (9)
subject to the household flow budget constraint and human and social capital laws of
accumulation (4) and (3):
A (t+ 1) = r (t)A (t) + wY (t) u (t)H (t)− C (t)− IS (t) + (1− δ)A (t) (10)
H (t+ 1) = B ((1− u (t))H (t))β (S (t))1−β + (1− δ)H (t) (11)
S (t+ 1) = IS (t) + (1− δ)S (t) (12)
where A (t) is the stock of assets and ρ is a psychological discount factor that is inversely
related to the rate of time preference.4 The representative household must end up with 0
net debt. Therefore, since the economy is closed we have A(t) = K(t). This implies that
the household flow budget constraint (10) reduces to expression (2), the law of motion of
physical capital.
The first–order necessary conditions for this problem are the following:(
C (t+ 1)
C (t)
)σ
= ρ (1 + r (t+ 1)− δ) (13)
u (t) = u (t+ 1)
K (t)H (t+ 1)
K (t+ 1)H (t)
((
1 + r (t+ 1)− δ
1 + wH (t+ 1)− δ
)
(
1− u (t)
1− u (t+ 1)
S (t+ 1)H (t)
S (t)H (t+ 1)
)(1−β)) 1α
(14)
K (t)
S (t)
=
(
α
1− α
)(
β
1− β
)(
u (t)
1− u (t)
)
(15)
where wH (t) = Bβ (S (t) / (1− u (t))H (t))
1−β is the marginal productivity of human
capital in the educational sector. Equations (13) and (14) describe respectively the opti-
mal consumption and time allocation to final good consumption. Equation (15) gives the
physical to social capital ratio at equilibrium.
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2.4 Equilibrium
We now characterize the equilibrium of this economy. This is done in the following propo-
sition.
Proposition 1 (Equilibrium) Given the initial conditions K (−1), H (−1), and S (−1),
an equilibrium is a path {Y (t) ; IK (t) ;K (t) ;C (t) ; u (t) ;H (t) ; IS (t) ;S (t) ; r (t) ;wH (t)}t≥0
that satisfies the following conditions:(
C (t+ 1)
C (t)
)σ
= ρ (1 + r (t+ 1)− δ) (16)
u (t) = u (t+ 1)
K (t)H (t+ 1)
K (t+ 1)H (t)
((
1 + r (t+ 1)− δ
1 + wH (t+ 1)− δ
)
(
1− u (t)
1− u (t+ 1)
S (t+ 1)H (t)
S (t)H (t+ 1)
)(1−β)) 1α
(17)
r (t) = αA (K (t) /H (t))α−1 u (t)1−α (18)
wH (t) = Bβ (S (t) / (1− u (t))H (t))
1−β (19)
K (t)
S (t)
=
(
α
1− α
)(
β
1− β
)(
u (t)
1− u (t)
)
(20)
Y (t) = A (K (t))α (u (t)H (t))1−α (21)
Y (t) = C (t) + IK (t) + IS (t) (22)
K (t+ 1) = IK (t) + (1− δ)K (t) (23)
H (t+ 1) = B ((1− u (t))H (t))β (S (t))1−β + (1− δ)H (t) (24)
S (t+ 1) = IS (t) + (1− δ)S (t) (25)
Equations (23), (24) and (25) are the accumulation rules of respectively physical, human
and social capital. Equations (16)–(25), together with the usual transversality conditions:
lim
T→∞
K (T ) ρT = 0 (26)
lim
T→∞
H (T ) ρT = 0 (27)
lim
T→∞
S (T ) ρT = 0, (28)
are sufficient for an optimum.
The proof of proposition 1 and further details on the corresponding optimization problem
are given in Baende Bofota et al. (2012), the working paper version of this article.
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2.5 Balanced growth paths
We now come to the study of balanced growth path (BGP) regimes. As usual, a BGP is a
particular solution to the equilibrium dynamics system displayed above where all variables
grow at a constant rate except r (t), wH (t) and u (t) which should be constant along this
path. For human capital we have H (t+ 1) = H (t) (1 + γH). The growth rates of the
variables Y (t), IK (t), K (t), C (t), IS (t), and S (t) are respectively γY , γIK , γK , γC , γIS ,
and γS. We first show that in our model, with social capital, all growing variables along
the BGP should have the same growth path.
Proposition 2 If H (t) grows at a rate γ∗H > 0, then all the other variables IK (t), K (t),
C (t), IS (t), and S (t) grow at strictly positive rates with:
γ∗Y = γ
∗
H = γ
∗
K = γ
∗
IK
= γ∗C = γ
∗
S = γ
∗
IS
(29)
The proof of this proposition is given in Appendix B of Baende Bofota et al. (2012).
Next we have to determine γH . To this end we need to impose restrictions on the long–
run levels. Computing these restrictions from the dynamic system (16)–(25) we end up with
8 equations for 9 unknowns
{
Y¯ ; K¯; C¯; u¯; H¯; I¯K ; I¯S; S¯; γH
}
. Therefore, the system in terms of
levels is undetermined, which is a usual property of endogenous growth models. However,
it is possible to stationarize this system to get rid of this indeterminacy. To do so we
rewrite the dynamic system (13)–(25) as a function of the following six stationary variables:
y (t) = Y (t) /H (t), k (t) = K (t) /H (t), ik (t) = IK (t) /H (t), c (t) = C (t) /H (t), s (t) =
S (t) /H (t), is (t) = IS (t) /H (t), u (t) and γH . The stationarized dynamic system is given
in Appendix D of Baende Bofota et al. (2012). With such a stationarized system, we
are able to discuss the existence and uniqueness of the steady state growth rate, and its
main determinants. As we shall see hereafter, the introduction of social capital crucially
changes the comparative statics of the steady state growth rate relative to the Lucas-Uzawa
benchmark. In particular, (permanent) technological shocks in the final good sector affect
the growth rate in the presence of social capital (as modeled in our paper) while they
definitely do not in the Lucas-Uzawa case. This is discussed in the following section.
2.6 Steady state growth rate: the role of social capital
After solving the aforementioned stationarized system, with many tedious computations, it
is possible to identify a closed-form solution to the steady state growth rate. Specifically,
one gets the following result.
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Proposition 3 (Existence and uniqueness) Let B >
(
1
Ψ
)1−β (1
ρ
+ δ − 1
) 2−(α+β)
1−α
. Then,
a unique positive steady state growth rate exists and is characterized by the following stable
and positive long–run value:
γ∗H =
(
ρ
(
1− δ +
(
B
1
1−βΨ
) (1−α)(1−β)
2−(α+β)
)) 1
σ
− 1 (30)
with Ψ = (Aα)
1
1−α
(1−α)
α
(1−β)
β
β
1
1−β
Proposition 3 suggests that, if the education sector is productive enough, there exists a
unique steady state growth rate. Because the sectors are heavily inter-related, the expres-
sion of the growth rate is much more complicated than the counterpart in the benchmark
Lucas-Uzawa model. But, in both cases, the growth rate is positive if the productivity in
the education sector is large enough. In the model with social capital, the growth rate is
a complicated function of many parameters, including the technology parameters in the
final good sector: this is a significant difference from the Lucas-Uzawa model (see algebraic
details below). This is a desirable property of social capital, whose essential role is to facil-
itate the connection between the different activity sectors. As modeled here, social capital
is the vehicle through which productivity improvements in the final good sector may also
have a positive impact on the education sector: the resulting positive wealth effect is likely
to increase investment in social capital, in this way boosting growth in the education sector.
We may perform comparative statics to check out the impact of the model’s parameters
on the BGP. Unfortunately, the expressions involved are so complex that it turns out to
be impossible to obtain the comparative statics analytically apart from the psychological
discount factor (standard negative effects of impatience on the long-term growth rate). The
same can be claimed for the other expressions obtained in the BGP, such as the equilibrium
allocation of human capital to the final good sector, the ratios of physical to human capital
and social to human capital respectively:
u∗ = 1−
β (γ∗ + δ)
(1 + γ∗)σ 1
ρ
− 1 + δ
(31)
k∗ = u∗
(
Aα
(1 + γ∗)σ 1
ρ
− 1 + δ
) 1
1−α
(32)
s∗ = (γ∗ + δ)


(
(1 + γ∗)σ 1
ρ
− 1 + δ
)β
Bββ


1
1−β
. (33)
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We obtain the comparative statics numerically in Section 3 once the model is con-
veniently calibrated. At this stage, we move on to a comparison with the benchmark
Lucas-Uzawa model.
2.7 Comparison with the Lucas–Uzawa’ model
With β → 1, there is no payoff of accumulating social capital since it contributes neither
to physical capital nor to human capital accumulation. Therefore, the model reduces to
the Lucas–Uzawa framework without externality, as there is no social capital accumulation
and the production functions from (1) and (4) simplify to:
Y (t) = A (K (t))α (u (t)H (t))1−α = C (t) + IK (t) (34)
H (t+ 1) = B (1− u (t))H (t) + (1− δ)H (t) (35)
It can be readily verified that the dynamic optimization of the Lucas–Uzawa model
yields the following expressions of the steady state growth rate, the share of human capital
allocated to physical capital accumulation and the physical to human capital ratio:
γ∗lu = (ρ (1− δ + B))
1
σ − 1 (36)
u∗lu = 1−
γ∗lu + δ
B
(37)
k∗lu = u
∗
lu
(
Aα
B
) 1
1−α
(38)
In contrast to our model with social capital, the steady state growth rate is unaffected
by parameters of the final good production function such as the productivity constant A
(Mulligan and Sala-i-Martin, 1992) and the physical capital elasticity α. In our model
productivity shocks in any of the two sectors raise the economy’s ability to accumulate
more social capital, in this way fostering human capital accumulation and ultimately eco-
nomic growth. In the classical Lucas–Uzawa model, only direct productivity shocks in the
education sector can do the job.5
Proposition 4 (Impact of A and α on γH) In contrast to the Lucas–Uzawa special case,
the BGP growth rate γ∗H is sensitive to productivity shocks in the final good sector and to
changes in the elasticity of physical capital.
Note that this result is sensitive to the assumption made about the cost of social capital
accumulation. Assuming that social capital accumulation implies an opportunity cost in
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terms of foregone consumption or physical capital investment entails a direct link between
the two sectors which materializes in the expression of the steady state growth rate. An
alternative modeling strategy that implies that the cost of social capital accumulation is
incurred in terms of human capital would entail a thoroughly different result, as shown
in Appendix A. Indeed, as can be seen in (54), the expression of the growth rate in this
alternative model does not depend on the parameters of the final good production function
A and α.
2.8 BGP and factor intensity of social capital in the education
sector
An interesting side product of our BGP analysis is the evolution of the growth rate when
the education sector becomes more and more intensive in social capital, that is when β
decreases. The analysis of the function form of γ∗H shows that it is continuous in β on the
interval ] 0, 1 [ . Moreover, we have:
lim
β→0
γ∗H =
(
ρ
((
(1− α)α
α
1−αB
(
A
1
1−α
)) 1−α
2−α
− δ + 1
)) 1
σ
− 1
lim
β→1
γ∗H = (ρ (1− δ + B))
1
σ − 1 = γ∗lu
A careful examination of the steady state growth rate first and second derivatives yields
the following results:
lim
β→0
dγH
dβ
= −∞, lim
β→1
dγH
dβ
= +∞, lim
β→0
d2γH
d2β
= +∞, and lim
β→1
d2γH
d2β
= +∞
Since dγH
dβ
(β) is also continuous in β on ] 0, 1 [ , the equation dγH
dβ
(β) = 0 should admit
at least one solution in that interval. Therefore, the steady state growth rate is a non
monotonic function of the elasticity of human capital in the education sector. One can
easily find numerical examples when the first derivative is always increasing, i.e. d
2γH
d2β
> 0
for β ∈ ] 0, 1 [ . In such cases, the human capital steady growth rate displays an inverted–
U shape curve. Figures 4 and 5 illustrate such an example with the following baseline
parameters: δ=0.05, ρ=0.98, σ=2, α=0.3, A=1, B=0.12273.
Insert Figures 4 and 5 about here.
Three comments are in order here. First of all, it is important to notice that having the
education sector more intensive in social capital is good for long run growth: in our model,
as social capital is produced from the final good and not from human capital (reflecting the
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hypothesis that it builds more on time diverted from production than on specific human
capital), the economy has two ways to stimulate growth, either through social capital or
human capital, instead of the one way specified in the Lucas-Uzawa model. The greater
the importance of social capital in the education sector, the greater the long-term growth
attainable. Second, this property is not true when β is close to one: when one starts to
depart from the Lucas-Uzawa model, the growth rate first decreases. It only increases
(when β keeps decreasing) when β is low enough. As a consequence, there must be another
mechanism counterbalancing the one mentioned just above, the interaction of both being
responsible of the non-monotonic picture encountered. A potential opposite mechanism is
the following: as β goes down, the education sector relies less on human capital (and more
on social capital). This means that the share of human capital in this sector is likely to
decrease,6 which will cause the growth rate to drop. In the neighborhood of the Lucas-
Uzawa model, when β is not too distant from 1, the latter mechanism dominates and the
BGP growth rate drops when β goes down. As β continues to decrease, this mechanism
becomes dominated by the first one (the availability of a second powerful growth engine,
social capital). Such a monotonic pattern may also be observed in the model presented in
Appendix A (cfr Figure 1), where the cost of social capital accumulation is expressed in
terms of human capital. Last but not least, even under the restriction 1 − α < β, which
ensures that the education sector is more intensive in “pure” human capital than the final
good sector is, the non-monotonicity property still holds.7
3 Numerical exercises
Let us consider the following calibration of the model. A first set of parameters is fixed
a priori to what we view as reasonable values given the available empirical evidence (see
Table 1). The rate of depreciation of all the forms of capital is set at 5%. The psychological
discount factor is 0.98. The absolute value of the elasticity of marginal utility is 2. A,
the total factor productivity of the goods and services sector, is normalized to 1. B, the
productivity parameter of the education sector is set at 0.12273, in order to obtain a growth
rate of 2%.
Insert Table 1 about here.
While the values of most of the parameters are calibrated on the basis of the existing
empirical studies, it is quite impossible to calibrate β in that way. Indeed, one can hardly
find information in the literature about the elasticity of either social or human capital in
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the education sector. To circumvent that difficulty, we perform a structural estimation of
(4), the law of accumulation of human capital.
3.1 Estimation of the elasticity of social capital
To simplify our specification, we assume full depreciation of human capital, that is δ = 1
and obtain
gH (t) = B (1− u (t))
β
(
S (t)
H (t)
)1−β
(39)
where gH (t) = 1 + γH (t) is the growth factor. Taking the logs of both sides of (39),
assuming that B = B¯eǫ and that the economies are in the steady state so that Proposition
(2) implies γ∗Y = γ
∗
H = γ
∗
K = γ
∗
IK
= γ∗C = γ
∗
S = γ
∗
IS
= γ∗ , we may write:
log (g∗) = log
(
B¯
)
+ βlog (1− u∗) + (1− β) log
(
S
H
∗
)
+ ǫ (40)
The specification (40) implies that the sum of the coefficients of the regressors is equal
to 1. To be consistent with our theoretical model we may assume that this restriction holds.
In that case, the estimation of (40) is equivalent to estimating:
log
(
g∗H
S
)
= log
(
B¯
)
+ βlog
(
(1− u∗)H
S
)
+ ǫ (41)
Therefore, we may estimate β through a simple regression model by regressing the
logarithm of the product of the steady state growth rate and the human to social capital
ratio on a constant and the logarithm of the product of the fraction of time the human
capital factor devotes to the educational sector and the inverse of the normalized social
capital.8
The steady state growth rate is proxied by data on GDP per–capita growth adjusted
for purchasing power parity (PPP, expressed in constant 2000 US dollars). Those growth
rates are computed on the basis of real GDP per capita data taken between 1980 and 2000
from the Penn World Table Version 6.2 (More information on the data sources is provided
on Appendix B).9
Data for social capital are obtained from the World Values Surveys (WVS).10According
to previous research on social capital at a macro level, social capital can be measured
through various indicators: the levels of generalized trust, associational activity and norms
of civic behavior. Trust is coded from WVS data as the percentage of respondents who
answer that most people can be trusted when asked “Generally speaking, would you say
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that most people can be trusted, or that you can’t be too careful in dealing with people?”
(Inglehart et al., 2000; Knack and Keefer, 1997; Paxton, 1999; Paxton, 2002; Uslaner, 1999;
Alesina and La Ferrara, 2000; Putnam, 2000; Whiteley, 2000; Zak and Knack, 2001; Delhey
and Newton, 2005).
Associational activity is the percentage of people involved in the following organizations
or activities: social welfare services for the elderly; handicapped or deprived people; edu-
cation, arts, music or cultural activities; local community action on issues such as poverty,
employment, housing, or racial equality; third world development or human rights; youth
work; religious or church organizations; sports or recreation; peace movements; and volun-
tary organizations concerned with health.11
Following Knack and Keefer (1997), the strength of the indicator of norms of civic
behavior is evaluated from responses to question about whether each of the following be-
haviors:“claiming government benefits to which you are not entitled”, “avoiding a fare on
public transport”, “cheating on taxes if you have a chance”, “keeping money that you have
found”, or “failing to report damage you’ve done accidentally to a parked vehicle” can
always be justified, never be justified or something in between.
There are several ways to construct an indicator of social capital: we may either consider
separately measures of trust, of norms and of participation in networks or we may combine
different measures of social capital in a unique social capital index. This unique social
capital index can be built from the different measures of social capital through principal
component analysis. Then, we retain the first principal component which account for the
highest share of the total variance of a set of social capital variables. The problem with prin-
cipal components is that they take negative values which are not convenient for logarithmic
transformation. We circumvent this difficulty by considering a monotonic transformation of
the first principal component: the Cumulative Normal Distribution Function. This allows
us to obtain a social capital index with values between 0 and 1.
Our model needs an approximation for the time spent by individuals in building up
human capital accumulation, (1− u∗). For this, we use the ratio of the average years of
schooling to life expectancy. For average years of schooling data we take Barro and Lee
(2000) data about the educational attainment of the total population aged 15 and over.
Data for life expectancy are taken from the World Bank. We consider data for 1980, 1985,
1990, 1995, and 2000. Following Fo¨ldvari and Van Leeuwen (2009, p.946), we consider that
(1 − u∗) is roughly equal to the share of time allocated to education and learning. Thus,
“dividing this by the life expectancy yields the share of the representative agent’s life that
is devoted to human capital formation by means of education” (Fo¨ldvari and Van Leeuwen,
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2009).
We get the following results: when social capital is measured as trust, or as a combined
measure of trust and civic norms, we obtain an estimate of β, of roughly 100%. Such results
appear as a confirmation of the Lucas Uzawa model, where human capital is the only factor
that plays a role in its own accumulation. They seem to suggest that social capital does
not impact on human capital formation, although this measure of social capital has been
shown to impact positively on the growth rate of the economy (Knack and Keefer, 1997;
Fukuyama, 2000).
When social capital is measured by the indicator of norms and civic behavior, we obtain
a value of the elasticity of human capital in the education sector of 94%, which implies an
elasticity of social capital of roughly 6%. These ways of measuring social capital allow
enough degrees of freedom in the estimation (68 observations for trust, 62 observations for
norms and for the combined measure of trust and norms). However, considering only norms
and trust does not seem to be the most intuitive way to capture social capital. While norms
and trust are pertinent dimensions of social capital, they are not sufficient for capturing all
the aspects of this polymorphous concept. Considering associational activity may allow us
to broaden the perception of that concept. Yet, this implies a severe drawback: the degree
of freedoms decreases sharply.
Measuring social capital exclusively through associational activity implies a value of
β of 0.89 and a number of used observations equal to 29. Combining trust, norms and
associational activity in a single indicator, we obtain 0.90 as the OLS estimate of the
elasticity of human capital in the education sector. In the simulation, we consider 0.90
as our value of β. This implies an elasticity of social capital in the educational sector of
10%. There is obviously an issue of endogeneity with this OLS estimate. Indeed, one might
expect that the output growth rate may affect the choice of the inputs of the educational
sector. To tackle that problem, we use values of regressors measured at the beginning of
the period on which the growth rates are evaluated (Knack and Keefer, 1997).
3.2 Numerical comparative statics of the BGPs
As mentioned in subsection 2.6, the comparative statics of the BGPs cannot be obtained
analytically apart from the psychological discount factor. For this parameter, we find the
standard and expected result that the higher the psychological discount factor ρ (i.e. the
lower the rate of time preference or equivalently the more people value future consumption),
the higher the long run growth rate. Table 2 includes the numerical comparative statics
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with respect to other parameters and for other variables than the BGP growth rate. The
computations are performed on the general model described above.
Insert Table 2 about here.
Some comments are in order. In the first place, and as suggested in Proposition 4,
technological shocks in the final good sector do foster long-term growth in our model with
social capital. An increase in A does raise the BGP share of human capital in the final
good sector and the physical to human capital, and social to human capital ratios as well,
which is intuitive. An increase in B, which is a productivity boom in the education sector,
has the same qualitative properties except that it raises human capital more than social
capital, which is again intuitively acceptable. The obtained impact of B-shocks on the
physical to human capital ratio is standard (see the Lucas-Uzawa case below). Second, a
decrease in β is found to increase growth: we are in a parametric region where making
the education sector more social capital intensive triggers long-term growth. Note also
that decreasing β increases the share of human capital in the final good sector. This
corroborates our interpretation of the non-monotonicity feature dealt with in subsection
2.8, and more precisely, our identification of the reverse mechanism playing through the
human capital share decision variable. In this sense, the obtained numerical comparative
statics are completely consistent with the intuitions presented so far.
The benchmark Lucas-Uzawa case To highlight the role of social capital in the findings
above, we present below the counterpart comparative statics for the Lucas-Uzawa model
(see Table 3).
Insert Table 3 about here.
Comparison of the two tables confirm the main and essential difference between the two
models: while technology shocks in the final good sector do not play any role in the BGP in
the Lucas-Uzawa model, they do matter when social capital is modeled. Other than this,
the comparative statics of the two models are qualitatively similar.
3.3 Productivity shocks
From propositions 3 and 4, we know that final good productivity parameters impact posi-
tively on the growth rate of the economy. This is one of the important differences between
our model and the standard Lucas-Uzawa model, where productivity parameters of the final
good sector have no impact in the long run on growth. In what follows, we analyze how an
economy responds to shocks to the parameters A (the productivity in the final good sector)
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and B (the productivity in the education sector). All the shocks considered are permanent
(from t = 0) and have an intensity equal to 1%. Shocks to these parameters can arise from
changes in education policy, changes to education subsidies, and changes in policy regimes,
innovation, and so forth.
3.3.1 Productivity shocks in the goods and services sector
In response to a productivity shock in the final good sector, standardized physical capital
increases to take advantage of the increased efficiency of the productive sector (see Figure
6). Depending on the value of the human capital elasticity in the education sector, the
share of human capital allocated to the goods and services sector may initially increase
(for β = 1 or β = 0.9; see Figures 2 (i) and (ii) in Appendix C) or decrease (for β = 0.5;
see Figure 2 (iii)). In the first case this implies a reallocation of human capital from the
education to the productive sector, while this would entail a reassignment of human capital
from the final good to the education sector in the second case.
As the marginal productivity of human capital in the education sector rises with social
capital, human and social capitals are complements in human capital accumulation. This
means that the demand for social capital in the education sector decreases in the first case
while it rises in the second case (see Figure 6). But as the education sector is the driver
of economic growth, it also entails a smaller human capital accumulation, an initial decline
of the economic growth rate in the first case (Figures 2 (iv) and (v) in Appendix C) and
an initial increase in the second case (Figure 2 (vi) in Appendix C). In the first case, the
resulting paucity of human capital induces agents to devote less time in the productive
sector. This entails a reverse reallocation of human capital from the productive to the
education sector and a subsequent rise of the demand of social capital and of the economic
growth rate. A reverse mechanism occurs in the second case.
The intensity of the elasticity of human capital in the education sector is of fundamental
importance in the way the economy adjusts in case of productivity shocks. For values of
β close to one, human capital and social capital are less substitutable as inputs of the
education sector. For this reason, in case of a rise of A the reallocation of human capital from
the education to the final good sector entails an initial drop-off of the growth rate. With
β << 1, the substitutability between the two inputs of the education sector increases.12
Therefore, the reallocation of human capital to the final good sector can be accommodated
by an increase of the social to human capital ratio.
Insert Figure 6 about here.
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3.3.2 Productivity shocks in the education sector
Let us now consider the impact of a shock in the education sector. As before, depending on
the intensity of the elasticity of human capital, we may distinguish two cases. If β is close
to 1, then the human capital growth rate increases (see Figures 3 (iv) and (v) in Appendix
D). As the education sector is more efficient, workers reallocate their working time in its
favor (see Figure 3 (i) and (ii) in Appendix D). Since human capital and physical capital
are complements, this lowers the physical to human capital ratio (see Figure 7).
Human capital and social capital are also complements; therefore, standardized social
capital also increases as a first step (Figure 7). But the reallocation of working time in
favor of the education sector ultimately causes a shortage of physical capital investment. To
avoid detrimental effects on output and the economic growth rate, agents opt subsequently
to spend more time in the productive sector.
In the case β << 1, once again the substitutability between social and human capital
increases. Therefore, agents take advantage of the income effect generated by the increased
productivity of the education sector by increasing their working time in the final good sector
(see Figure 3 (iii) in Appendix D). As human capital and social capital are complements,
this induces an initial decrease of the social to human capital ratio (Figure 7). This ini-
tially has a detrimental effect on the human capital growth rate. However, it subsequently
increases, as agents increase their working time in the education sector.
Insert Figure 7 about here.
3.4 Imbalance effects
The analysis of imbalance effects represents an important line of research in endogenous
growth models with human capital. These effects are due either to the relative abundance
of physical capital13 or inversely to the relative abundance of human capital. The most
important result that can be derived from analyzing the imbalance effects in the Lucas-
Uzawa model is that a shortage of human capital motivates an allocation of resources to
production of goods rather than education. This will decrease the accumulation of human
capital, lowering the economy’s growth rate. Thus, the model predicts that an economy
should experience faster recovery after an event that destroys physical capital than if it had
destroyed human capital. It also suggests that the economies that are growing faster are
those with higher ratios of human capital to physical capital.
In contrast to the one-sector model with the same technology for producing physical and
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human capital, the two-sector model does not give rise to symmetric U-shaped imbalance
effects. The rationale behind this finding is quite simple: since the education sector is more
intensive in human capital, its operation cost is larger in case of a shortfall of human capital
because of the induced higher wage. This motivates people to allocate human capital to
the final good sector rather than to the education sector (Boucekkine and Ruiz-Tamarit,
2004 and 2008; Boucekkine et al., 2008).
Imbalance effects are depicted in Figure 8. Figure 8 shows that the relationship between
the human capital growth rate and the physical to human capital ratio is always monotonic.
However, depending on the human capital elasticity β, it can have a negative (when β = 0.5)
or a positive slope (when β = 0.9 or β = 1). Indeed, as stated before, when the elasticity of
human capital in the education sector is high, social capital is less substitutable for human
capital. Therefore, individuals allocate more working time to the education sector which
allows a higher accumulation of human capital and therefore a higher economic growth rate.
Consequently, since there is less human capital available in the final good sector, firms use
proportionally more physical capital, which explains the positive relationship between the
economic growth rate and the physical to human capital ratio.
A contrario, when β = 0.5, the substitutability between social and human capital in-
creases, which means that individuals may allocate more working time to the final good
sector without impeding economic growth. Therefore, a lower physical to human capital
ratio coexists with higher economic growth rates as suggested by the negative slope of the
curve corresponding to β = 0.5 shown in Figure 8.
Insert Figure 8 about here.
4 Conclusion
In this paper, we build an endogenous two-sector model where the interaction between
human and social capital drives the accumulation of human capital. First of all, we choose
a multisector model in which social capital plays the advocated role of a timing belt that
propagates shocks through the macroeconomy. As a result, and in contrast to the seminal
Lucas-Uzawa model, the steady state growth rate depends on productivity parameters
of ALL the sectors, not only those arising from the education sector. Assuming that
any investment in social capital implies an opportunity cost in terms of foregone physical
capital accumulation and consumption creates a direct link between the two sectors which
materializes in the expression of the steady state growth rate.
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We present three types of findings in this paper. First of all, we show that the presence
of social capital has an ambiguous effect on long-term growth. Indeed, we obtain a U-
shaped pattern for the steady state growth rate with respect to social capital elasticity in
the education sector. When the education sector is intensive in social capital, the latter may
act as a substitute for human capital. This allows a higher allocation of human capital to
the final good sector and therefore enables the economy to achieve higher output, a higher
consumption level, and a higher investment in social capital, which recursively may sustain
a higher economic growth rate. However, in the neighborhood of the Lucas-Uzawa model,
when social capital elasticity is much lower, the education sector relies less on social capital.
In such a case, the only way to foster economic growth is through increases of the human
to social capital ratio. Such a parameter region is consistent with a strong empirical result
uncovered by Putnam (2000) about the US economy: the concommittance of a growing
economy with a declining social to human capital ratio. Second, we try to provide an
estimate of the “weight” of social capital in the process of human capital formation. Our
main finding in this respect is that the elasticity of human capital to social capital varies
from 6% to 10%, depending on the measure of social capital selected. Last, but not least,
through numerical examples, we show that the magnitude of social capital elasticity may
have a strong impact on transitory dynamics. A higher social capital elasticity may induce
a decreasing pattern of the steady state growth with respect to the physical to human
capital ratio, while lower values may entail an increasing pattern.
It goes without saying that our analysis has the advantages and limits of multisector
endogenous growth models, which build on stylized laws of motion for aggregate variables.
The process of social capital formation is probably much trickier at the micro level.14
However, we believe that our model highlights in a transparent and accurate way the
role of social capital in the growth process, and this role is indeed ambiguous. We have
uncovered the sources of this ambiguity and provided a numerical assessment of the impact
of social capital on long-term growth and short-term dynamics using available data on social
capital measures. More work is needed on the microfoundations of social capital and on its
measurement.
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Notes
1Some researchers still express reluctance to consider social capital as a “capital”. For instance, Solow
(1995) suggests that social capital may hardly be considered as capital since the measurement of its stock
“seems very far away”. However, an increasing number of economists now admit that social capital shares
at least some similarities with physical and human capital namely its intertemporal dimension and its
ability to generate a stream of future benefits (Chou, 2006).
2We are grateful to Jean-Pierre Laffargue for this insight.
3In Appendix A, we explore an alternative setup where the cost of investing in social capital is incurred
in terms of time.
4The precise expression of the psychological discount factor ρ in terms of the rate of time preference ξ
is the following ρ = 1
1+ξ
.
5The same remark can be made about the share of human capital in the final good sector and physical
to human capital ratios along the BGP. Comparison of equations (37) and (38) with equations (31) and
(32) speaks for itself. Only the productivity parameter in the education sector, B, is relevant in the long
run for the last-mentioned magnitudes in the Lucas-Uzawa case while the presence of social capital in our
model provides the necessary vehicle for technology improvements in the final good sector to matter in
the long-run for these magnitudes. In this sense, our modeling exemplifies the role of social capital in the
development process.
6This specific effect is corroborated in Section 3.
7In Figure 4, α = 0.3, non-monotonicity arises in the β-interval, ]0.7 1].
8It is obvious that it would have been better to use more sophisticated methods, such as those proposed
by Panel data econometrics, to estimate the human capital elasticity. However, the significant number of
missing data in the social capital indicators prevents it.
9Since yearly data on GDP per capita may incorporate short–run disturbances, real GDP per capita
rates averaged over five year periods and growth rates are computed. More precisely, we compute growth
rates for the following periods: 1980–1985, 1985–1990, 1990–1995 and 1995–2000.
10Detailed information on theWorld Values Survey may be obtained from http://www.worldvaluessurvey.org/
11Other associations or activities such as political parties, labor unions or professional organizations are
discarded since they seem to refer predominantly to organizations generally oriented towards redistributive
goals for the exclusive benefit of their members.
12A property of the Cobb-Douglas production function of the education sector is that the inputs involved
are complements since no human capital accumulation is possible when the stock of either of them is zero.
But, at the same time, they are substitutable since human capital accumulation may be kept constant while
the decrease in the stock of one of the inputs is compensated by the increase of the stock of the other. The
substitutability between human and social capital increases when β << 1.
13or equivalently to the shortage of human capital.
14Obviously it will be interesting in a future contribution to provide microfoundations for social capital
accumulation. Growiec and Growiec (2012) provides an interesting contribution in this regard. However,
their model does not include human capital. Therefore, an interesting research perspective would be to
propose a multisector endogenous growth model with adequate microfoundations for the law of motion of
social capital.
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Appendix A: Alternative model
In our model, we assume that, while increasing social interaction, investment in social
capital implies an opportunity cost in terms of foregone physical capital accumulation and
consumption. There is an alternative way to model the cost of social capital accumulation;
we may assume that individuals devote a fraction l (t) of their time to building their social
networks. Such an assumption implies the following laws of motion for human and social
capital accumulation:
H (t+ 1) = B ((1− u (t)− l (t))H (t))β (S (t))1−β + (1− δ)H (t) (42)
S (t+ 1) = Cl (t)H (t) + (1− δ)S (t) (43)
With the intertemporal utility function (9) and the physical capital accumulation law
(10), they imply the following equilibrium conditions:
(
C (t+ 1)
C (t)
)σ
= ρ (1 + r (t+ 1)− δ) (44)
u (t)
u (t+ 1)
=
K (t)H (t+ 1)
K (t+ 1)H (t)
((
1 + r (t+ 1)− δ
1 + wH (t+ 1)− δ
)
(
(1− u (t)− l (t))
(1− u (t+ 1)− l (t+ 1))
S (t+ 1)H (t)
S (t)H (t+ 1)
)(1−β)) 1α
(45)
r (t) = αA (K (t) /u (t)H (t))α−1 (46)
wH (t) = Bβ (S (t) / (1− u (t)− l (t))H (t))
1−β (47)
1− u (t)− l (t)
1− u (t− 1)− l (t− 1)
=
S (t)H (t− 1)
S (t− 1)H (t)
(
1 + C (1−β)
(β)
(1−u(t)−l(t))H(t)
S(t)
− δ
1 + wH (t)− δ
) 1
1−β
(48)
Y (t) = A (K (t))α (u (t)H (t))1−α (49)
Y (t) = C (t) + IK (t) + IS (t) (50)
K (t+ 1) = IK (t) + (1− δ)K (t) (51)
H (t+ 1) = B ((1− u (t)− l (t))H (t))β (S (t))1−β + (1− δ)H (t) (52)
S (t+ 1) = Cl (t)H (t) + (1− δ)S (t) (53)
As before, after solving the corresponding stationarized system, we are able to identify
a closed-form solution to the steady state growth rate:
γ∗H =
(
ρ
(
1− δ +
(
Bββ ((1− β)C)1−β
) 1
2−β
)) 1
σ
− 1 (54)
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Figure 1: Human capital’s growth rate as a function of β (alternative model).
In contrast to expression (30), this function does not depend on parameters A and α.
However, as shown in Figure 1, for baseline parameters δ=0.05, ρ=0.98, σ=2, α=0.3, A=1,
B=0.12273 and C=1.07105 it displays an inverted-U shape as in Figure 4.
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Appendix B: Data and descriptives
The dataset used in the empirical subsection consists of 74 countries:
Country list: Albania, Argentina, Australia, Austria, Bangladesh, Belarus, Belgium,
Bosnia and Herzegovina, Brazil, Bulgaria, Canada, Chile, China, Colombia, Croatia, Czech
Republic, Denmark, Egypt, Estonia, Finland, France, Georgia, East Germany, West Ger-
many, Great Britain, Hungary, Iceland, India, Indonesia, Iran, Iraq, Ireland, Italy, Japan,
Jordan, Republic of Korea, Latvia, Lithuania, Macedonia, Malta, Mexico, Moldova, Mon-
tenegro, Morocco, Netherlands, New Zealand, Nigeria, Northern Ireland, Norway, Pak-
istan, Peru, Philippines, Poland, Portugal, Puerto Rico, Romania, Russia, Rwanda, Serbia,
Slovakia, Slovenia, South Africa, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, Taiwan, Tanzania, Turkey,
Ukraine, United States, Uruguay, Venezuela, Vietnam.
The dataset draws on publicly available data only. The variables listed below are avail-
able online through the corresponding web links:
Variables:
1. GDP per capita growth rate adjusted for PPP (expressed in constant 2000 US dollars)
between 1980 and 2000 computed from Alan Heston, Robert Summers and Bettina
Aten, Penn World Table Version 6.2, Center for International Comparisons of Produc-
tion, Income and Prices at the University of Pennsylvania, September 2006 available
online at http://pwt.econ.upenn.edu/php site /pwt62/pwt62 form.php.
2. Social capital indicators — levels of generalized trust, associational activity and norms
of civic behavior — obtained from the World Value Surveys (European and World
Values Surveys four-wave integrated data file, 1981-2004, v.20060423, 2006) available
online at http://www.wvsevsdb.com/wvs/WVSData.jsp.
3. Human capital indicator — average years of schooling of the total population aged 15
and over from Barro and Lee (2000) available online at http://www.cid.harvard.edu/
ciddata/ciddata.html.
4. Life expectancy data obtained from World Bank online data available at
http://data.worldbank.org/topic/social-development.
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Appendix C: Effects of productivity shocks in the
goods and services sector on u (t) and γH (t)
0 5 10 15 20 25 30 35
0.3845
0.385
0.3855
0.386
0.3865
0.387
0.3875
0.388
Periods
u
∗
Plot of u∗ for β = 1
 
 
(i)
0 5 10 15 20 25 30 35
0.433
0.434
0.435
0.436
0.437
0.438
0.439
0.44
0.441
0.442
0.443
Periods
u
∗
Plot of u∗ for β = 0.9
 
 
(ii)
0 5 10 15 20 25 30 35
0.7
0.701
0.702
0.703
0.704
0.705
0.706
0.707
0.708
Periods
u
∗
Plot of u∗ for β = 0.5
 
 
(iii)
0 5 10 15 20 25 30 35
0.0252
0.0252
0.0253
0.0253
0.0254
0.0254
0.0255
0.0255
Plot of γ∗
H
for β = 1
Periods
γ
∗ H
(iv)
0 5 10 15 20 25 30 35
0.0188
0.019
0.0192
0.0194
0.0196
0.0198
0.02
0.0202
Plot of γ∗
H
for β = 0.9
Periods
γ
∗ H
(v)
0 5 10 15 20 25 30 35
0.0395
0.04
0.0405
0.041
0.0415
0.042
0.0425
Plot of γ∗
H
for β = 0.5
Periods
γ
∗ H
(vi)
Figure 2: Effects of A productivity shocks on u and γH for β = 1, β = 0.9 and β = 0.5.
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Appendix D: Effects of productivity shocks in the
education sector on u (t) and γH (t).
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Figure 3: Effects of B productivity shocks on u and γH for β = 1, β = 0.9 and β = 0.5.
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Figure 4: Human capital growth rate as a function of β.
0.2 0.4 0.6 0.8 1.0
Β
-0.3
-0.2
-0.1
0.1
¶ ΓH
¶ Β
Figure 5: Human capital growth rate derivative as a function of β.
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Table 1: Parameters
Parameter Symbol Value
Rate of depreciation of capital δ 0.05
Psychological discount factor ρ 0.98
Absolute value of the elasticity of marginal utility σ 2
Physical capital share in the final sector α 0.3
Total productivity in the final sector A 1
Total productivity in the education sector B 0.12273
Human capital share in the education sector β 0.9
Table 2: Comparative statics: general model.
γ∗H u
∗ k∗ s∗
A + + + +
B + + + -
α - + + +
β - - + -
ρ + - - +
δ - - - +
σ -1 + + -
Baseline 0.0200 0.4335 1.7893 0.6062
Notes:
1 Holds if ρ
(
1− δ +
(
B
1
1−β Ψ
) (1−α)(1−β)
2−(α+β)
)
> 1. The red signs are displayed when it is impossible to sign the
derivatives uniquely through an analytic inspection. In this case, they are determined from the evaluation of the derivatives
of the steady state values arrayed vertically with respect to the parameters arrayed horizontally.
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Table 3: Comparative statics: Lucas Uzawa model
γ∗H u
∗ k∗
A 0 0 +
B + + -
α 0 0 +3
ρ + - -
δ - -2 -2
σ -1 +1 +1
Baseline 0.0255 0.3846 1.3791
Notes:
1 Holds if ρ (1− δ +B) > 1. 2 Holds if ρ (1− δ +B) > 1 and σ > 1. 3 Holds if
(
1− α+ α log
(
αA
B
))
> 0.
As in Table 2 the red signs are determined from the evaluation of the derivatives of the steady state values arrayed vertically
with respect to the parameters arrayed horizontally evaluated with the following baseline parameters: δ=0.05, ρ=0.98, σ=2,
α=0.3, A=1, B=0.12273.
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Figure 6: Effects of A productivity shocks on k and s.
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Figure 7: Effects of B productivity shocks on k and s.
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Figure 8: Comparison of different physical to human capital ratio imbalance effects for
different values of the elasticity of human capital in the education sector (β = 1 (Lucas-
Uzawa model), β = 0.9, β = 0.5).
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